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Abstract Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a key exchange protocol which is implemented over
free space optical links or optical fiber cable. When direct communication is not possible, QKD is
performed over fiber cables, but the imperfections in detectors used at the receiver side and also the
material properties of fiber cables limit the long-distance communication. Free-space based QKD
is free from such limitations and can pave the way for satellite-based quantum communication to
set up a global network for sharing secret messages. To implement free space optical (FSO) links,
it is essential to study the effect of atmospheric turbulence. Here, an analysis is made for satellite-
based quantum communication using QKD protocols. We assume two specific attacks, namely PNS
(photon number splitting) and IRUD (intercept-resend with unambiguous discrimination), which
could be main threats for future QKD based satellite applications. The key generation rates and
the error rates of the considered QKD protocols are presented. Other parameters such as optimum
signal and decoy states mean photon numbers are calculated for each protocol and distance. Further,
in SARG04 QKD protocol with two decoy states, the optimum signal-state mean photon number
is independent of the link distance and is valid for the attacks considered here. This is significant,
highlighting its use in a realistic scenario of satellite quantum communication.
Keywords Free space optics · geometric losses · quantum key distribution · quantum teleportation ·
satellite applications · space technology · total attenuation · turbulence.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution [1, 61, 62, 67] is an advanced secure key exchange technique in the field
of quantum communications. Due to high losses, optical fibers are not the practical choice for di-
rect transmission of photons for global distances. Direct satellite links and fiber-based quantum
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repeaters are the two methods to overcome this problem. Quantum repeater technique will enhance
the communication distance significantly which is not possible by optical fibers [3, 5, 6]. Quantum
repeaters based on optical fibers are unable to achieve true global distances and it is also difficult
for other approaches based on error correction [7–9], which need repeater stations placed at inter-
vals of a few kilometers. Therefore, in order to establish communication over global distances many
repeater stations are needed, with a large number of qubits per station [10].
Quantum secure communication is achieved by three different satellite scenarios. In the first
case, a source of entangled photons is implemented on the satellite itself and photons are sent to
two ground stations. This approach helps in distributing two photons to the two users at the same
time, separated several thousands of kilometers, even for Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. After
transmission, the correlation property is examined for testing whether the two photons are still
entangled or not, in order to confirm the security. Random detection of photons are used for gener-
ating the secure key and is not restricted to the entangled photon security of the source itself. This
concept has an important impact on the satellite based quantum research, where an autonomous
satellite with an entangled photon source could make the source functional. Attenuated laser pulses
are the second alternative by which quantum sources can be realized. These laser pulses contain
single photons by emitting pulses of low optical power, which results in only a single photon from
the source. Decoy pulses must be deployed to avoid the side channel attack due to multi photons
per pulse [36,44,50,52,63,64,89–92].
In the third scenario, the transmitter and receiver are at the ground, and satellite station respec-
tively. Hence, here the signal propagates from Earth to space. This method has a unique feature
which includes adapting the quantum source according to the requirement during the complete
mission. By this approach, one can achieve both foundational tests of quantum mechanics and
quantum cryptography. In this work, we concentrate on this particular scenario.
The quantum transceiver designed must be small enough to be launched on a nano-satellite,
specially dedicated to this task. A straight forward model would posses one fixed telescope, around
10 - 30 cm aperture, for sending or receiving photons. A very suitable ground station is needed
possessing an optical telescope which tracks the satellites. An optical telescope of a diameter not
less than 0.5 m can be used. In satellite quantum communication, losses are due to diffraction,
which scales more with distance, and not due to absorption.
Satellite-based quantum communication plays an important and efficient role in the setup of
a global network [11–15, 17–21, 72]. These satellite based quantum communication schemes are
designed for FSO communications [22]. For successful implementation of satellite based quantum
communication, it is necessary to consider free-space QKD under atmospheric turbulence. In an
earth-satellite link, only around 30 km of the path (depending on the satellite elevation) are inside
the atmosphere. The link attenuation must be below 60 dB for earth to space quantum commu-
nication, above this value quantum communication is not feasible. Link distance (L) for various
scenarios between earth to space are as follows: ground-LEO and LEO-ground links is 500 to 1400
Km; ground-GEO and GEO-ground is above 36, 0000 Km; for LEO-LEO (intersatellite link) is 2, 000
Km; LEO-GEO (intersatellite link) link distance is 35, 500 Km and link distance for GEO-GEO (in-
tersatellite link) is 40, 000 Km. Although the technological advancement in commercial applications
of QKD has met with enormous success, quantum communication still needs more investigations
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to deal with issues related to security, data rate, and communication distance [23–25,93,118–120].
The Chinese quantum satellite Micius is one of the several Microsatellite missions launched
in the year 2016 which consists of a big platform with a dedicated technology demonstration.
This is a space-based quantum key distribution (QKD) system. For the commercial purpose,
satellite-based QKD systems must be cost effective, small in size and reliable for real-field ap-
plications [60, 68].The cryptographic key for implementing QKD technology aboard the Chinese
satellite Micius, part of the quantum experiments at space scale (QUESS) mission placed into orbit
in August 2016 and a number of quantum-optical experiments have been developed and conducted
in recent times [60,68,94–97].
There are a number of projects running, ranging from QKD technology verification within orbit
to setting up fully automatic links and key exchange with many ground stations based on op-
tical setup. Some of the relevant examples in this regard are the Japanese SOTA (small optical
transponder) laser communication terminal onboard the microsatellite SOCRATES (space optical
communications research advanced technology satellite), a hot-air balloon and photon reflection
experiment was performed between the LAGEOS satellite (laser geodynamics satellite or laser ge-
ometric environmental observation survey, using action of corner-cube reflectors) and the Italian
Matera Laser-Ranging Observatory (MLRO) as well as a recent Chinese experiment with a small
payload on Tiangong-2 Space Lab in the Chinese Micius satellite. Further, QKD links between
ground stations and airplanes have been demonstrated by many academic groups in Canada, Ger-
many, Waterloo and Munich [60,68,98].
Currently, most of the projects are aimed towards development of technology. National Uni-
versity of Singapore has investigated entangled-photon on nanosatellite. QUTEGA is a German
national quantum technologies funding scheme, which will build a nanosatellite to carry a quantum
payload with numerous sources embedded in photonic chip technique. The Canadian government
is funding an important project known as QEYSSat. The aim of the project is to establish a mi-
crosatellite into orbit to carry a single photon detection system. Thus, this is different from other
projects, in which a receiver is used in the setup placed in space. This is an important mission
which is developed for radiation-hard single-photon detection systems, polarization-mapping as-
sembly and a fine-pointing system. Other countries are also performing quantum-based satellite
communication projects. Some of them are CubeSat Quantum Communications Mission started by
U.K. and NanoBob project started by France and Austria [60,68].
The SpaceQuest experiment, which was jointly developed by the University of Waterloo and the
German aerospace company OHB System, is mainly used for the testing of quantum-physical
effect known as gravitationally induced decoherence. The subsystem was mainly developed by
University of Waterloo, in which quantum key distribution is a secondary mission [60, 68]. In
addition to the successful Chinese experiments, several satellite based quantum communication
schemes [17,34,35,55,69–73,75–84,86–88,113] have also been proposed.
In this paper, we have analyzed the performance of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in
satellite-earth down and up, and in intersatellite links, with two QKD protocols: SARG04 and
BB84, with and without decoy states. In real field applications, we have considered real telescope
dimensions and usual atmospheric conditions before sunset, 5 dB and 11 dB, in clear summer
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day. In addition to this, we have considered two specific attacks the photon number splitting, and
the intercept-resend with unambiguous discrimination attacks. We have not included losses due to
pointing errors or misalignment of the optics. These effects can be included in the term δdiff , as an
additional diffraction (geometric loss). These losses if taken into account, would only shift, slightly,
the communication distance axis to the right. Various results related to secure key generation rate
and communication distance are calculated with and without decoy states for each protocol. In
addition to these, effect of mean photon number on secure key generation rate as well as on com-
munication distance is investigated. The results shown that, it is feasible to establish quantum key
distribution with LEO (Low Earth Orbit) satellites, but not possible with GEO (Geostationary
earth orbit satellites). The optimum mean photon number for SARG04 with two decoy states does
not depend on distance between transmitter and receiver (link distance), which underscores its
importance to perform well in a real scenario.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II sketches the methodology for an FSO communi-
cation link under various atmospheric conditions. In section III, the secure key rate for different
QKD protocols is briefly discussed. We discuss our results in section IV and conclude in section V.
2 Methodology for FSO Links under various atmospheric conditions
It is well known that three effects mainly contribute to the total channel attenuation in an FSO
link (denoted as δ ∈ [0, 1]):diffraction, atmospheric propagation, and efficiency of the receiver.
Assume that Cassegrain type telescope architectures at sender and receiver sides and laser
beams of Gaussian type are used for the said arrangement [26,27], obscuration and beam diffraction
generate attenuation and shown to be [28,29].
δdiff = (e
−2γ2tα2t − e−2α2t )(e−2γ2rα2r − e−2α2r ), (1)
γt =
bt
Rt
, γr =
br
Rr
, αt =
Rt
ωt
, αr =
Rr
ωr
,
ωt = Rt, ωr =
√
2λL
piRt
,
where bt, br, and Rt, Rr represent radii of the secondary (b) and primary (R) mirrors at trans-
mitter (t) and receiver (r) respectively; L is the distance between telescopes (also known as link
distance), λ is the considered wavelength and ωt,r is the beam radius at transceiver ends.
We are not considering losses due to pointing errors or misalignment of the optics. These effects
can be included in the term δdiff , as an additional diffraction (geometric losses). These losses if
taken into account, would only shift, slightly, the communication distance axis to the right.
The atmospheric attenuation δatm is due to various phenomena such as turbulence, scattering
and absorption. Hence it can be written as δatm = δscattδabsδturb, where each quantity represents the
attenuation of the corresponding phenomena. Here absorption and scattering depend on elevation
angle and direction of transmission. The effects due to atmospheric turbulence are enlarged beam
divergence, results in less amount of signal power collected by the receive telescope. Other effects
generated due to turbulence are decoherence, beam-wander, scintillation and pulse distortion and
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Fig. 1 Beam-spreading in downlink scenario [117].
Fig. 2 Beam-wandering and beam-spreading in uplink scenario [117].
broadening. The turbulence effects are different for ground to space and space to ground scenarios.
In a space to earth scenario light first propagates through vacuum for larger distances before being
affected by the atmospheric turbulence, whereas in earth to space scenario, beam spreading effects
due to turbulence occur at the beginning of the photon propagation, which causes a high value
of divergence. These generic scenarios are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. More detailed description
of free space optics and turbulence effects can be obtained from [30–32, 34, 69]. Gas molecules and
aerosols absorb the light when it passes through the atmosphere. Turbulence is the main factor
which contributes in atmospheric attenuation. This is because of thermal fluctuation which pro-
duce refractive index variations. The main factors which determine turbulence are the atmospheric
conditions and the position of the ground station [69]. Turbulence effects are calculated by increas-
ing the divergence angle of the beam. In uplink, attenuation caused by turbulence is calculated
as [34]
δturb =
(
λ
Rt
)2
(
λ
Rt
)2
+ θ2turb
, (2)
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where θturb is the additional divergence, in radians, produced by turbulence. The expression for
θturb is, θturb =
λ
r0
, where r0 is Fried parameter. r0 ≈ (λ) 65 . Total channel attenuation is written as
δ = δdiffδatmδrec. (3)
The above equation for total attenuation (δ) is represented in dB (dB is calculated as 10log10(δ)
= 10log10(δdiff ) + 10log10(δatm) + 10log10(δrec) ). In above equation δdiff , δatm and δrec represent
attenuation due to geometrical losses, atmospheric losses and losses due to receiver inefficiency,
respectively. In our current work, we are using Eq. 3 for calculating total attenuation (δ) which also
includes attenuation due to detector inefficiency. In case of uplink (ground to space links), the total
attenuation (δ), excluding attenuation due to detector efficiencies, can also be written as
δ =
L2
(
θ2T + θ
2
atm
)
D2R
1
TT
(
1− LP
)
TR
10Aatm/10, (4)
where Aatm is the attenuation of the atmosphere in dB. Aatm = 1 dB for excellent sight conditions
(no haze, fog, or clouds) and is valid only in certain wavelength region. θT =
λ
DT
, here θT is the
divergence angle resulting from the transmit telescope. DT is the diameter of the transmit telescope.
LP represents pointing loss. TT and TR are the telescope transmission factors. We consider TT =
TR = 0.8. Here we are considering LP = 0. r0 is 9 cm for 800 nm. In above equation, δrec = 3 to
3.5 dB attenuation must be added which is due to detector efficiency operating in the wavelength
range of 650 nm to 1550 nm. The satellite telescopes radius of the primary and secondary mirrors
are 15 cm and 1 cm, respectively. The ground telescope radius of the primary and secondary mir-
rors are 50 cm and 5 cm, respectively. The values of telescope radii have been obtained from the
SILEX Experiment [56] and the Tenerife’s telescope [55]. The scattering and absorption attenuation
is evaluated using a model of clear standard atmosphere [58] which results in ηscatt = 1 dB.
For calculating total channel attenuation, the considered parameters are shown in Table 1. We
have considered λ = 650nm, it seems reasonable because suitable avalanche photo detector (sil-
icon avalanche photo detector) for single photon detection is available. At telecom wavelength,
λ = 1550 nm, link attenuation increases due to high beam divergence at large wavelength and due
to higher absorption in the atmosphere. At λ = 1550 nm, due to longer wavelength, the photon
becomes weaker, hence detection of single photon particularly at this telecom wavelength becomes
difficult to detect. The present quantum technology exists between 700-800 nm wavelength range,
which is close to visible light and effect of natural light pollution starts dominating. In addition
to this, sunlight intensity at 1550 nm is five times weaker than at 800 nm, this is the reason that
background noise has to reduce at a very low level, hence it is another difficult task to perform at
this telecom wavelength.
Geometric loss increases with the increasing link range. In a free space optic model, geometric
loss can be reduced by deploying low value of divergence angle of laser beam. Under geometric
attenuation, light beam diverges from transmitter to receiver, hence most of the light beam does
not reach the receiver’s telescope and signal loss occurs. It is necessary to increase the receiver
aperture area so that geometric losses can be controlled (minimized) by collecting more signal at
the receiver telescope.
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3 THE SECURE KEY RATE ANALYSIS WITH DIFFERENT PROTOCOLS
Here we study BB84 and SARG04 QKD protocols, with and without decoy states, under two specific
attacks, namely PNS (photon number splitting) and IRUD (intercept-resend with unambiguous
discrimination) attacks.
3.1 The BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol was proposed in [1], see [38, 39] for details. The attenuated laser pulses used
in practical QKD schemes are coherent in nature and described by coherent states. The output
pattern obtained from lasers follow the Poisson distribution [26,40].
|α〉 = e−|α|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉. (5)
Here |α| = √µ, µ is the mean photon number of a pulse. The probability Pn(µ) corresponding
to n photons in a pulse is given by
Pn(µ) = |〈n|α〉|2 = e−|α|2 |α|
2n
n!
= e−|µ|
|µ|n
n!
(6)
In QKD, the transmitter transmits the bit stream in the form of optical pulses via a quantum
channel [41, 42]. These optical pulses are specified by a number known as beam intensity µ (mean
photon number) which ranges from 0.1 to 0.5. Here 0.1 indicates 1 photon every 10 pulses [13,17,72].
For bit encoding in QKD system, the polarization of only a single photon is used. In BB84 protocol,
polarization filters are used to polarize the photons [13, 18, 19]. The Shannon mutual information,
I(A : B) and I(B : E), shared between Alice (A)-Bob (B) and Bob (B)-Eve (E), respectively are
calculated in bits/pulse [43,61]. Here,
I(A : B) =
∞∑
n=0
(
1− (1− δ)n
)
Pn(µ) ≈ µδ, (7)
I(B : E) =
∞∑
n≥2
Pn(µ). (8)
Eve’s Information, IEve, is defined as
IEve ≈ I(B : E)
I(A : B)
. (9)
The lowest value for the key generation rate R (in bits/pulse) is expressed in [38,43,44]
R ≥ q
(
−Qµf(Eµ)H2Eµ +ΩQµ
(
1−H2
(Eµ
Ω
)))
, (10)
where Ω (Ω = 1 − IEve)denotes those photons, from which Eve cannot extract any information,
also known as untagged photons [44]. Also q represents the efficiency of the considered protocol,
the values of q are 1/2 and 1/4 for BB84 and SARG04 protocols, respectively. f(x) represents the
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bi-directional error correction efficiency, whose value is 1.22 for the Cascade protocol [45].The yield
of the n-photon pulses is represented as Yn [44].
The expected raw key rate can be written as [50]
Qµ =
∞∑
n=0
YnPn(µ). (11)
Quantum Bit Error Ratio (QBER), Eµ, is [50]
Eµ =
∑∞
n=0 YnPn(µ)en
Qµ
=
Y0
2Qµ
. (12)
Here, Y0 represents dark counts.The above expression is due to the bit error ratio of n-photon
signals being en =
Y0
2Yn
, given that the dark counts, Y0, are the only effect causing QBER. Also, for
binomial probability distribution,
∑∞
n=0 Pn(µ) = 1.
3.2 The SARG04 Protocol
The SARG04 protocol was proposed in [46] and is more powerful compared to BB84 against the
photon number splitting attack. The quantum communication phase in SARG04 is similar to that
in the BB84 protocol, but the distinction exists in the encryption and decryption of Shannon’s
classical information part [61]. In this protocol, the bases are not communicated, but Alice declares
one nonorthogonal state out of the four pairs Aω,ω′ = {|ωx〉, |ω
′
z〉}, where ω, ω′ ∈ {+,−} and
| ± x〉 = 0, | ± z〉 = 1, [46–48].
Comparison between SARG04 and BB84 QKD protocols
The SARG04 protocol protects against the PNS attack, without extra resources. In the BB84
protocol, Alice and Bob use two non-orthogonal polarization bases Z(|V 〉, |H〉) and X(|45◦〉, |−45◦〉).
Alice randomly sends one of the four non-orthogonal polarization states (|V 〉, |H〉, |45◦〉, and
| − 45◦〉). After quantum communication is completed, Alice and Bob each disclose their basis.
However, the SARG04 protocol uses four sets: s1 = (|V 〉, |45◦〉), s2 = (|V 〉, | − 45◦〉), s3 = (|H〉,
|45◦〉), and s4 = (|H〉, | − 45◦〉). Alice randomly sends one of the two non-orthogonal polarization
states in the randomly selected set; Bob uses either the Z basis or the X basis to measure the pho-
ton. After quantum communication is finished, Alice and Bob exchange the information of Alice’s
selected set and Bob’s measuring basis. Thus, quantum communication in SARG04 is identical to
the BB84 protocol; only the classical key sifting procedure is modified. At that time, SARG04 is
secure for two photon pulses. For example, if Alice sends |V 〉 with two-photon pulses and discloses
s1 = (|V 〉, |45◦〉), then Eve obtains |V 〉 by the Z basis and measures |45◦〉 or | − 45◦〉 with 50 %
probability by the X basis. Eve cannot differentiate the state from her measurement in two-photon
pulses. Hence, SARG04 produces a secret key from one-photon and two-photon pulses, whereas
BB84 produces a secret key from one-photon pulses. The SARG04 protocol can generate the secret
key even when a pulse contains two photons, because Eve cannot get full information of Alice’s key
from the two-photon pulse [114].
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At first, a photon number non-demolition quantum measurement is performed during IRUD at-
tack; if a pulse has one or two photons, Eve blocks it, otherwise she performs a generalized quantum
measurement. If the measurement is conclusive, she uses a transparent quantum channel to send a
copy of the state to Bob.
In IRUD attack, Eve introduces some attenuation. If the channel attenuation is less than that
introduced by the IRUD attack, Eve should apply a different strategy, otherwise her presence would
be immediately detected. In such circumstances, she blocks a fraction t of the single-photon pulses,
keeps one photon from each two-photon pulse, and performs the IRUD attack on the rest of the
multi-photon pulses. Then, the attenuation can be written as
δ =
(1− t)P1 + P2(µ) + χ
µ
, t ∈ [0, 1]. (13)
Here χ is expressed as
χ =
∞∑
n≥3
Pn(µ)Pok(n), (14)
where Pok represents the probability of acceptance. For BB84 protocol, this value is 0.5 [45,48].
The value of Pok depends on the number (n) of photons of the state and the overlap of the basis, but
it is not less than 12 [46–48]. Using this attack, Eve does not obtain information from single-photon
pulses.
In general, Pn(µ) is the Poisson probability distribution of photons for every weak laser pulse
of the transmitter, taking into account the assumption that there are n photons in a pulse. In the
same context, P1 and P2 represent probability of 1 and 2 photon(s) attenuation.
In PNS attack, Eve first performs a photon number non-demolition measurement to identify
Alice’s multi-photon signals. Eve blocks all single photon pulses, while for multi-photon pulses she
stores one photon in a quantum memory, and resends to Bob the remaining photons by a trans-
parent quantum channel. When Eve performs the PNS attack, she introduces some attenuation. If
this attenuation is lower than the channel attenuation, Alice and Bob can not notice the presence
of Eve, and thus Eve can obtain full information. If the attenuation introduced by PNS attack is
more than the allowed channel attenuation, Eve has to apply different strategy to hide her presence.
In SARG04 QKD protocol information is encoded in four nonorthogonal states, when a gener-
alized measure is performed, it is necessary to have at least three copies of the state to obtain a
conclusive result with probability Pok(n) [21,47]. Therefore, in order to obtain full information, Eve
must carry out an IRUD attack (Intercept-Resend with Unambiguous Discrimination).
If the attenuation introduced during IRUD attack carried out by Eve, is more than the channel
attenuation, her presence can easily be detected by the authenticate users (Alice and Bob). In a
high-attenuation channel, Eve may extract full information about the key. This is the reason that
Eve does not apply PNS attack in such conditions. Hence, she applies a different strategy to hide
her presence, depicted in Eq. 13.
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The attenuation introduced by Eve in Eq. 13 is defined as the ratio between the mean num-
ber of photons that are received and the mean number that would be received in the absence of
attenuation (i.e. µ). According to Eve’s planning, discussed above, the mean number of photons
obtained can be calculated as the sum of a fraction (1 - t) of the single-photon pulses, plus one
photon for each two-photon pulse, plus one photon for the pulses with three or more photons that
lead to conclusive measurements. This last term is denoted by χ.
Similarly, Eve blocks a fraction s of the two photon pulses and apply IRUD attack on the
remaining multi-photon pulses, to hide herself, as represented by Eq. 15. The attenuation in this
case can be written as
δ =
(1− s)P2(µ) + χ
µ
, s ∈ [0, 1]. (15)
Fig. 3 represents the comparison between IEve and distance in km under the BB84 and SARG04
protocols. This is calculated based on the link parameters described in subsequent sections. From
this figure, it is observed that Eve obtains more information in the BB84 protocol as compared
to SARG04 protocol. Hence, it can be concluded that SARG04 protocol outperforms the BB84
protocol under such specific conditions.
In SARG04 protocol, the secret key can be generated with both single photon and two-photon
states. The SARG04 protocol can generate the secret key even when a pulse contains two photons,
because Eve cannot get full information of Alice’s key from the two-photon pulse [114], as shown
in Fig. 3.
3.3 Protocols with the decoy-states: An effective approach to counter Eavesdropping
The decoy-state method was proposed in [49], and further studied in [50–52]. Introducing decoy-
states (also known as extra test states) help in detecting the presence of eavesdropping, whereas
signal states are deployed for key generation only [63,64,89]. The shared mutual information is
I(A : B) = P1(µ)(1− t) + P2(µ)(1− s) +
∞∑
n≥3
Pn(µ)Pok(n), (16)
I(B : E) = P2(µ)(1− s)I2 +
∞∑
n≥3
Pn(µ)Pok(n), (17)
here t represents the fraction of the single photon pulses blocked by Eve, and s denotes a fraction
of the two-photon pulses. I2 is the amount of information that Eve can obtain from a single copy
of the state [46]. Next, we analyze the security of the protocols under consideration.
1) BB84 protocol: Vacuum + weak decoy state:
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A lower bound on the key generation rate [50,99], based on entanglement distillation described
in [53] which in turn use the concept of decoy-state, is
RBB84 ≥ q
(
−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1
(
1−H2(e1)
))
, (18)
where Qµ represents the gain of the signal state, Eµ denotes the QBER, Q1 represents the gain
of single-photon states and e1 denotes the error rate of single-photon states.
The parameter Q1 is [54]
Q1 = Y1e
−µµ. (19)
The lower bound for Q1 and upper bound for e1 with the vacuum and a weak decoy state (ν)
is [50]
Y L1 =
µ
(µν − ν2)
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ
(ν2
µ2
)
− (µ
2 − ν2)
µ2
Y0
)
≤ Y1, (20)
QL1 = µe
−µY L1 ≤ Q1, (21)
eU1 =
e0Y0
Y L1
≥ e1. (22)
2) The SARG04 protocol: Vacuum + two weak decoy states:
Single-photon states help in key generation rate in BB84 protocol, whereas both single-photon
and two-photon states contribute to the key generation rate in the SARG04 protocol [54]. Taking
this into account with the approach developed in [53], the gain in case of two-photon pulses is [43,54]
Q2 = Y2e
−µµ
2
2
. (23)
The SARG04 protocol uses three decoy states, ν0, ν1 and ν2, assuming that ν0 is the vacuum
(i.e. ν0 = 0), and the two weak decoy states are ν1 and ν2. For these decoy states, gain and quantum
bit error rate are [50]
Qνi =
∞∑
n=0
YnPn(νi), (24)
Eνi =
∞∑
n=0
YnPn(νi)en
Qνi
. (25)
The bit error ratio of the n-photon signals, which is due to only the dark counts Y0, is
en =
Y0
2Yn
.
Let the legitimate users (Alice, Bob) select ν1 and ν2 which satisfy [50]
0 < ν1 < ν2, ν1 + ν2 < µ. (26)
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Now the key generation can be shown to be [50]
RSARG04 ≥ q
(
−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1
(
1−H
(
Z1
X1
))
+
Q2
(
1−H(Z2)
))
,
(27)
where Xn and Zn represents the binary random variables. H2(.) is the Shannon’s binary entropy
function [43].
In Eq. 27, we can replace H(Z1/X1) with H2(e1), and H(Z2) with H2(e2), because Eve’s at-
tacks (i.e. IRUD attack) does not introduce phase error or bit errors, and we assume that the only
source of errors, i.e. the dark counts, is independent of the signal, phase and bit errors which are
independent from each other and have the same distribution.
The lower limit of the two photon gain is [50]
QL2 =
Y L2 µ
2e−µ
2
≤ Q2. (28)
The upper limit of e2 can be manipulated by considering quantum bit error rate of weak decoy
states [50].
EνiQνie
νi = e0Y0 + eiνiY1 + e2
ν2i
2
Y2 +
∞∑
n=3
enYn
νni
n!
. (29)
4 Results
The results shown here are based on three scenarios: uplink, downlink, and intersatellite links. The
parameters for link establishment (shown in Table 1) are detector efficiency (δrec), satellite tele-
scope radius (Rt,r), satellite secondary mirror radius (bt,r), ground telescope radius (Rt,r), ground
secondary mirror radius (bt,r), dark counts (Y0) [112, 113] and wavelength (λ) whose values are
65%, 15 cm, 1 cm, 50 cm, 5 cm, 50 × 10−6 counts/pulse and 650 nm, respectively. λ = 650 nm
represents an absorption window with a commercial detector made of silicon avalanche photo diode
with high detection efficiency. Silicon avalanche photo diode with internal gain can work with high
data rate. The optical efficiency in the receiver (f) = cλ ; for 650 nm wavelength, frequency will be
4.61538 × 108 MHz, which is 461.538 THz. The 650 nm region is close to the highest efficiency
detection region (65%). The optical frequency (for example of a quasi-monochromatic laser beam)
is the oscillation frequency of the corresponding electromagnetic wave. For visible light, optical
frequencies are roughly between 400 THz (terahertz = 1012 Hz) and 700 THz, corresponding to
vacuum wavelengths between 700 nm and 400 nm. We assume a wavelength in the 650 nm region
because the diffraction spread is the smallest. Silicon avalanche photo diodes are deployed to detect
the wavelengths in between 250 nm and 1100 nm. These photo diodes detect even the very weak
light intensities and very fast optical signals because of their avalanche effect. The absorption spec-
trum of silicon is quite broad. Visible wavelengths (400-1100 nm) are serviced by silicon avalanche
photodiode which has > 50 % detection efficiency with maximum count rates in MHz range and low
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dark counts. InGaAs avalanche photo diodes and superconducting single photon detectors detect
infrared wavelengths (950 - 1650 nm). The major drawbacks of InGaAs avalanche photo diodes
(APD) are higher dark count rates, lower detection efficiencies and low repetition rates. These are
the reasons that InGaAs APDs are not used for satellite mission. Telescope radius values are taken
from [55,56].
Fig. 3 Variation in Eve’s information with communication distance for each protocol under the uplink case (δturb =
5 dB) calculated using Eqs. 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, and 15.
The attenuation caused by turbulence in the uplink scenario is computed considering two usual
atmospheric scenarios, one for δturb = 5 dB (before sunset) and other for δturb = 11 dB (in a
clear summer day) [57]. Effect of turbulence on the downlink is almost negligible [69], as shown in
Tables 2 and 3. A value of δscatt = 1 dB is achieved for the scattering plus absorption attenuation
with the help of Clear Standard Atmosphere model [58]; these values are similar to those discussed
in [34, 69]. In Fig. 3 we simulated the considered system parameters to interrelate the attenuation
with distance and the condition IEve = 1 is achieved for the optimum parameters (attenuation =
13 dB, µ = 0.1 for BB84 protocol and attenuation = 25.6 dB, µ = 0.2 for SARG04 protocol) [46].
In Fig. 4 we have shown the dependency of key generation rates on the communication distance
for the considered protocols. The pulses emitted from the laser source can be converted from
bits/pulse to bits/second [36]. We take the values of µ and ν which are mean photon numbers
of signal state and decoy states, respectively, in the range of [0, 1] with a step 0.001. The number
of pulses used as the signal state and the vacuum state are Nµ = 0.95N , and N0 = 0.05 N (sent
by Alice), where N = 100 Mbit. In Fig. 5, we have optimized µ and ν
′s
i in each protocol for both
the states to obtain the highest key rate.
In Fig. 4, it is observed that critical distance obtained for SARG04 is comparatively higher
than BB84, both with and without decoy states. Also in Fig. 4, it is shown that SARG04 is more
robust against eavesdropping than BB84 with an optimal mean photon number. The decoy state
method used in BB84 protocol enhances the critical distance. Decoy state method is a powerful
technique that increases both the critical distances and key generation rate for both the entangled
and non-entangled based protocols [59].
In case of increasing attenuation, the number of multi-photon pulses must be minimized which
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Fig. 4 In uplink (δturb = 5 dB), secure key generation rate for all protocols under investigation calculated using
Eqs. 10, 18, and 27.
helps in reducing the chance of attacks performed by Eve (in this case µ must be decreased) as
shown in Fig. 5. At the higher value of µ, the protocol becomes more robust. With increasing mean
photon number, we achieve enhanced communication distance and at the same time, the considered
protocols are resistant to Eve’s photon number splitting (PNS) attack. Due to movement of the
satellite along its orbit, its distance with the ground station varies. The value of µ has to be adjusted
to achieve the maximum secure rate, which is the challenging part of the problem.
Fig. 5 Variation in optimum mean photon number with communication distance for all protocols under the uplink
case (δturb = 5 dB). These variations in µ correspond to the highest achievable secure rates, as shown in Fig. 4.
.
In Fig. 6, for each protocol in uplink scenario, secure key generation rate decreases at constant
value of µ, which is independent of the distance. This is the maximum value at maximum distance
for the protocols under analysis. In this figure, for the protocols based on decoy states, we get
comparatively low decrease (less than 3%), which clarify that the dependency of µ on distance
is not required. In case of other protocols, keeping µ constant, secure key rate decreases by 25%
and 50% from their maximum values at short distances. The results depicted in Fig. 6, for each
protocol indicates the maximum key generation rates, keeping µ constant to that of optimal µ
for maximum distance. It is clearly observed that in case of protocols based on decoy states the
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Table 1 Link Parameters for uplink, downlink and intersatellite links
Considered Parameters Numerical Values
Detector efficiency (δrec) 65%
Wavelength (λ) 650 nm
Dark Counts (Y0) [112,113] 50 × 10−6 counts/pulse
Ground secondary mirror radius (bt,r) 5 cm
Satellite secondary mirror radius (bt,r) 1 cm
Ground telescope radius (Rt,r) 50 cm
Satellite telescope radius (Rt,r) 15 cm
Table 2 Critical distance for different protocols under consideration [Km]
Scenarios BB84 SARG04 BB84:Vacuum + SARG04:Vacuum +
weak decoy state two weak decoy state
Downlink 1540 3290 9450 14100
Intersatellite 430 920 2660 3900
Uplink(δ = 5 dB) 460 1520 4650 6980
Uplink(δ= 11 dB) - 500 2200 3460
Table 3 Maximum possible secure rate for different protocols under consideration [Bits/Pulse]
Scenarios BB84 SARG04 BB84:Vacuum + SARG04:Vacuum +
weak decoy state two weak decoy state
Downlink 1.7.10−2 2.4.10−2 4.4.10−2 4.6.10−2
Intersatellite 2.0.10−2 2.6.10−2 4.8.10−2 5.0.10−2
Uplink(δ = 5 dB) 1.4.10−4 1.2.10−3 5.8.10−3 6.5.10−3
Uplink(δ= 11 dB) - 7.5.10−5 1.4.10−3 1.6.10−3
secure rate decreases to a level below 3%, which means that in this situation the variation in mean
photon number with distance is not necessary. The result is opposite to that of protocols based on
non-decoy states where rate degradation occurs rapidly. This implies that the value of mean photon
number should vary with distance for obtaining optimum results for secure rates. The rest of the
three cases (downlink, uplink in clear weather conditions and inter satellite links) follows the same
steps.
It would be appropriate, at this juncture, to make a comparison between the results obtained here
and the pertinent literature:
1. The total channel attenuation is the result of three effects, it is given by
δ = δdiffδatmδrec.
.
The total channel attenuation is represented by δ. In above equation δdiff , δatm and, δrec repre-
sent attenuation due to geometrical losses, atmospheric losses and losses due to receiver inefficiency,
respectively. We have taken into account this total channel attenuation in our current work, whereas
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Fig. 6 (Color online) Blue (dotted) :- BB84; Green (small dashed):- SARG04; Red (large dashed):- BB84: Vac-
uum+weak decoy state; Purple (continuous dark line):- SARG04: Vacuum+two weak decoy states. In the uplink
scenario (δturb = 5 dB), for each protocol, variation in secure key rate (R) with communication distance at constant
value of mean photon number calculated using Eqs. 10, 18, and 27.
such type of channel attenuation is not used in [54, 114,116].
2. This work is focused on realistic scenarios of satellite uplink, downlink and intersatellite
quantum communication. We are considering two specific type of attacks; PNS (photon number
splitting) attack and IRUD (intercept-resend with unambiguous discrimination) attacks [21, 47].
The results shown are valid for these specific attacks, and hence, our tabulated values differ from
that in [115,116], where IRUD attack was not considered.
When Eve performs the PNS attack, she introduces some attenuation. If this attenuation is less
than the channel attenuation, Alice and Bob can not notice the presence of Eve, and thus Eve can
obtain full information. Eve introduces no errors when performing the PNS attack.
3. We assume that the dark counts of the detector are the only source of quantum bit errors,
which are quantified by the quantum bit error ratio (QBER). In addition to this, we considered
dark count (Y0) = 50 × 10−6 [112, 113], which comes in the detection range of the considered de-
tector, i.e., Si-APD (silicon avalanche detector); whereas value of dark count (Y0) is 1.7 × 10−6,
in [115,116]. We have considered values of the parameters given in Table 1.
4. The lower bound of the key generation rate for SARG04 is given in Eq. 27 [54], where Xn
and Zn represent the bit error and the phase error events, respectively, for n-photon pulses. Xn
and Zn are binary random variables, they take a value equal to one when there is a bit or phase
error, and zero othersiwe. H(.) is the Shannon entropy of a random variable [43]. The specific class
of Eve’s attacks we are considering (i.e., IRUD attack) does not introduce phase error or bit er-
rors, and the only source of errors, i.e., the dark counts, is independent of the signal, phase and
bit errors which are independent from each other and have the same distribution. Hence, we can
replace H( Z1X1 ) with H2(e1), and H(Z2) with H2(e2). Here e1 is the error rate of single-photon states.
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Tables 2 and 3 exhibit the critical distance and secure key generation rate for both BB84 and
SARG04 protocols, with and without decoy states. The critical distances and secure key generation
rates in the downlink are significantly larger as compared to uplink scenario, due to lack of tur-
bulence induced attenuation in downlink scenario. In addition to this, in MEO satellite downlink
quantum communication with decoy states quantum key distribution protocols are possible. These
optimum results are not possible in case of intersatellite quantum communication links, due to
reduced telescope dimensions. The most challenging and difficult part in such realistic scenarios are
turbulence generated attenuation and telescope dimensions. Comparing all these tabulated results
in such realistic scenarios and specific attacks considered here, we conclude that SARG04 QKD
protocol with decoy states outperforms the BB84 protocol in terms of both a higher secret key rate
and greater secure communication distance.
Geometric attenuation is responsible for the light beam to diverge in its propagation path. To
minimize these signal losses, receiver aperture area is increased to collect more light by the tele-
scope to diminish the geometric losses. Hence SARG04 protocol deploying with decoy states obtains
highest key rate as well as maximum link range. Finally, we can claim that the optimum results are
obtained when we use pulses with two photons plus optimum µ.
In the uplink scenario, secure key generation is low because of high attenuation [93,100,113]. At
the same time, the value of µ cannot be increased due to PNS (photon number splitting) attack.
To minimize the effects of PNS attack and to increase the secure key generation rate WCP (weak
coherent pulse) is preferred over entangled photon source [99, 113]. The background count rate for
uplink is higher than downlink because of artificial light pollution emitted upward [113]. Our results
show significant design considerations, e.g., type and features of detectors and sources, operating
wavelength, ground station locations, specific orbits and telescope design.
Power needed at ground station is more as compared to the power needed at the satellite. The
main reason for this is that uplink frequency is set high as compared to downlink frequency. In
uplink, attenuation is more because of turbulence effects. Hence we need powerful devices to send
signals. In addition to this, it is much easier to compensate losses due to attenuation on earth due
to no weight limitation. On the other hand, weight and space limitations are predominant on the
satellite, hence the need to minimize attenuation [101,102].
Attenuation and frequency are directly related to each other. Signal losses are higher for higher
frequencies, hence more power is required for efficient transmission. The beam of lower frequency
is broad whereas a beam of higher frequency is narrow. Earth station has to focus the signal to
a small point on satellite in space, which is performed by deploying a narrow beam generated by
higher frequency [103,104].
Satellite covers a large area on the ground by providing service to many earth stations, using
broad beam generated by lower frequency [105, 106]. For visible wavelengths, turbulence effects
come into picture when using a transmitter telescope of more than 25-50 cm diameter [107, 108].
Turbulence effects can be minimized by selecting a good ground station [69]. In addition to this, an
adaptive optics system can be used to minimize the turbulence effects [109,110].
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5 Conclusion
We have used realistic scenarios for investigating the feasibility of quantum key distribution, in
satellite quantum communication; uplink, downlink and intersatellite links, with BB84 and SARG04
QKD protocols. We have implemented these protocols with and without decoy states for supporting
future satellite quantum communication systems. For this reason, we have used practical values of
optical hardware and used normal atmospheric conditions. In addition to this, we assumed two
specific attacks, namely PNS (photon number splitting) and IRUD (intercept-resend with unam-
biguous discrimination), which could be main threats for future QKD based satellite applications.
The key generation rates and the error rates of the considered QKD protocols are presented. Other
parameters such as optimum signal and decoy states mean photon numbers are calculated for each
protocol and distance. Our results indicate that, it is possible to establish LEO (Low Earth Orbit)
and, MEO (Medium Earth Orbit) satellites. Further, in SARG04 QKD protocol with two decoy
states, the optimum signal-state mean photon number is independent of the link distance. This
could enhance its significance in a realistic scenario of satellite quantum communication. These
results are valid for the specific attacks considered here.
In order to achieve long distance communication, it is necessary to reduce the link losses. Actual
data may be used to better understand the atmospheric turbulence and define a propagation model
that should help the receiver and transmitter design. Moreover, new communication protocols that
exploit the atmospheric turbulence as a resource can be defined. Our telescope design data could be
used in future for single photon long distance free space experiments, like teleportation and QKD.
This study will help to experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of Earth-space quantum links.
The uplink allows the complex quantum source to be kept on the ground while only simple
receivers are in space, but suffers from high link loss due to atmospheric turbulence, necessitating
the use of specific photon detectors and highly tailored photon pulses. For better performance and
to enhance the communication distance one could use six or more nonorthogonal states. Further,
the effect of adding pointing and misalignment errors need to be taken into account for greater
improvement.
Downlink performance is better than uplink scenario, the reason being that we can place heavy
receiving telescopes on earth as compared to space. Also most of the time the beam propagates in
vacuum with small diffraction spreading and comes under the effect of atmospheric turbulence in
the final stage of propagation.
In this work low earth orbits (altitude upto 1000 km) are considered. They provide advantages of
lower optical loss, less costly to attain and easy to operate than higher orbits, making them feasible
in near future. To reduce background noise, quantum key distribution link can be performed at
nighttime. Hence, one can aim to achieve a global scale quantum key distribution.
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